Abstract
Introduction
Password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) schemes [5] , [11] , [12] allow two or more parties to share a common secret key to secure subsequent communications. PAKEs are popularly studied because most systems depend on human interactions, as is relevant to the context of present day ubiquitous environments; thus using a password is more practical than a high-entropy secret key. If a human user is assigned a high-entropy secret, he would try at first instance to change it to an easily memorizable password, or be tempted to write it down somewhere or have his web browser cache it. The first known PAKE secure against dictionary attacks is the Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) by Bellovin and Merritt [5] , for 2 parties. Subsequently, PAKEs for groups (3 parties or more) have been proposed, e.g. [2] , [9] .
Research in group PAKEs can be seen to proceed in two directions: one initiated by Abdalla et al. [2] where each member shares a different password with a server, so called the DPWA setting; while the other initiated by Bresson et al. [9] where group members all share the same password known as the SPWA setting.
Perhaps the most well known scalable group key exchange is the one by Burmester and Desmedt [11] , in the SPWA setting. This is well suited for dynamically changing groups since the number of rounds of messages sent between group members is constant, irrespective of the group size. Extensions to this scheme appear in [17] , [1] . The recent PAGKE scheme by Kwon et al. at IWSEC 2006 [17] is an adaptation of the Burmester-Desmedt to the SPWA password setting, and is said to be the first provably secure constant-round PAGKE in the standard model (without requiring ideal random oracles). As far as we know, only three constant-round SPWA-type PAGKE schemes secure in the standard model exist, two of which are analysed in this paper: the scheme by Kwon et al. and the scheme by Abdalla and Pointcheval [3] .
Our Results. We treat two PAGKE schemes in the SPWA setting: the PAGKE scheme by Kwon et al. [17] and the scheme by Abdalla and Pointcheval [3] . The benefit of schemes in this setting is that no trusted server S is required.
First, we give an undetectable online dictionary attack against PAGKE. Our attack exploits verifiable messages that are similar to the offline dictionary attacks by [1] against [14] , [18] . We then show that due a correctness problem, key indistinguishability of the Abdalla-Pointcheval scheme comes under question. To the best of our knowledge, our results are the first known analysis of both these two schemes of [17] , [3] . In recent years, the issue of undetectable online dictionary attacks has been raised [13] , [21] , [22] because while it is accepted that online dictionary attacks cannot be avoided for password-based schemes, the typical mitigation which is outside the scope of protocol design, is to limit the number of failed login attempts. However, this mitigation will only work if failed login attempts can be detected in the first place. But for undetectable online dictionary attacks, incorrect password guesses and thus failed login attempts go unnoticed by the legitimate protocol participant being attacked by the adversary. Thus, the adversary's active attacks via Send queries (within the context of the security model; see Section 2.1) cannot be differentiated from honest executions of a legitimate and honest protocol participant, so security against undetectable online dictionary attacks cannot be bound in the same way as detectable online dictionary attacks in terms of Send queries.
We also show that an inconsistency between the partnering definition in the security model and how the group session key is generated, leads to a simple but subtle attack on key indistinguishability that fails to be captured by the scheme's proofs. This is related to showing that a scheme does not meet the correctness requirement [3] of AKE schemes, defining that if two instances of protocol participants are partnered and accepted, then both should hold the same session key.
Preliminaries

Model for Group Key Exchange
For completeness, we describe here the group key exchange (GKE) security model [10] , [7] , [8] .
PROTOCOL PARTICIPANTS AND EXECUTION. Let U be a non-empty set of protocol players or parties. The adversary, A, controls the communications between all protocol players by interacting with the set of oracles, Π s Ui , where Π s U is defined as the s th instantiation of a player, U i ∈ U, in a specific protocol run. A controls the communication channels via queries to the targeted oracles, as below.
• Send(Π • Reveal(Π s Ui ) query. Any oracle upon receiving such a query and if it has accepted and so holds session key K, sends this to A.
• Corrupt(U ) query. This query allows the adversary to learn the long-lived key of user U .
Under the strong corruption model, internal data of any instances of U executing the protocol are also given to A. Under the weak corruption model, only the long-lived key is given to the adversary.
query. This oracle query is only available if Π s Ui is "fresh". It allows to define the indistinguishability-based notion of security for the key, defined by the following game, denoted Game GKE (A, P ), between adversary A and oracles Π s Ui involved in executions of protocol P . During the game, A can ask any of the above queries, and may only ask the Test query once. Depending on a randomly chosen bit, b ∈ {0, 1}, A is given the actual session key if b = 1 or a session key drawn randomly from the session key distribution if b = 0. Finally, A outputs a guess b ′ . Informally, A succeeds if it can guess the bit b with non-negligible advantage Adv GKE P,A over randomly guessing, where the advantage is defined as
Note that the first three queries: Send, Reveal, Corrupt are common for any kind model for authenticated key exchange protocols, to model the adversary's ability to attack the protocol. The final query Test is used to define the security of the protocol for which the adversary aims to break, in this case, that of the indistinguishability of the session key.
The Constant-Round PAGKE Protocols
Let U 1 , . . . , U n be the identities in lexical order of n users. Denote by G a finite cyclic group of order q ∈ Z * p , where p and q are two primes such that p = 2q +1, and p a safe prime such that the Decisional Diffie Hellman (DDH) is hard in G. g, g 1 and g 2 denote generators of G of order q such that the discrete logarithmic relation between g 1 and g 2 is unknown. || denotes concatenation. All arithmetic operations in this paper are performed under the group G.
PAGKE Schemes in SPWA Setting
The PAGKE scheme designed in the SPWA setting by Kwon et al. [17] at IWSEC 2006 builds on the Burmester-Desmedt scheme in [11] . Since the Burmester-Desmedt scheme is designed without authentication of messages, Kwon et al. suggest to authenticate broadcast messages from group members by masking with a function of the group password. To be precise, this scheme which they called as PAGKE, is described in Fig. 1 . Meanwhile, another PAGKE scheme designed in the SPWA setting is by Abdalla and Pointcheval [3] at ASIACRYPT 2006, which builds on the Burmester-Desmedt [11] , Gennaro-Lindell [15] and Katz-Ostrovsky-Yung [16] schemes. For compactness, this is specified in Fig. 2 .
Some
Attacks on SPWA-based PAGKE Schemes
PAGKE Scheme
We show an undetectable online dictionary attack on the Kwon et al. scheme PAGKE [17] .
1) Make a guess pw ′ of the group password pw. For any x chosen by the adversary, compute
2) Initiate a session and during Round 1 issue Send queries to send
Otherwise, repeat from step (1.) by making another guess of pw ′ . Note that U i will not notice that anything is wrong or that an incorrect password was used because the scheme does not explicitly check that passwords used by other group members are correct.
In fact, the adversary can do better by mounting this attack in parallel, i.e. simultaneously making n different password guesses, and launching the attack against all U i for i = 1 . . . n. Thus, each session allows to verify n password guesses instead of just 1.
Abdalla-Pointcheval Scheme
Abdalla and Pointcheval presented [3] a constantround PAGKE scheme based on the group key exchange scheme of Burmester-Desmedt [11] and the 2-party PAKE schemes of Gennaro-Lindell [15] and Katz-Ostrovsky-Yung [16] . The scheme works in broadcast mode, where messages sent from a group member is received by all other members.
Our main observation is the definition of session identifier sid used subsequently in the definition of partnering within the security model defined by Abdalla and Pointcheval in [3] . For completeness, we restate the definitions here.
Partnering [3] . Let 
This is a standard definition of sid and partnering. In fact, the use of sid i in their scheme specification in Fig. 1 of [3] differs from the standard sid i definition given in their model, i.e. here the sid i is given as a function of only some but not all messages sent and received by each group member. Thus, there are in fact two versions of sid i definitions in [3] . We give a simple attack similar to the attack in Section 3.2 that works on the Abdalla-Pointcheval scheme when partnering is defined as above in their security model. 1) Adversary A launches an Execute query for a protocol session involving group members U 1 , . . . , U n . This models the adversary eavesdropping on messages exchanged among members during this session.
Round 1:
Each group member U i chooses a random number r i ∈ $ Z * q , computes
. Each U i broadcasts U i ||1||X i , where 1 represents the broadcast message in the first round.
Round 2:
Each U i computes x i−1 and x i+1 using pw and the sender's identities U i−1 and U i+1 , respectively. Then U i computes Y i = (x i+1 /x i−1 ) ri and broadcasts U i ||2||Y i .
Key computation:
Each U i computes the secret key for F as
, and the session key sk i = F ki (U||sid ′ ), 2) A then initiates a new protocol session involving the same group members, this time issuing a Send query in Round 4 to replace broadcast
i is the Round 4 message of the previous session. The rest of the protocol steps proceed normally.
3) A issues a Reveal query to U j and obtains the session key sk. 4) A issues a Test query to U i and obtains the test session key sk * . 5) A checks if sk * = sk and outputs b = 1 if it is. Otherwise it outputs b = 0.
Note that based on the standard definition of sid in the Abdalla-Pointcheval model [3] restated above, U i and U j will have different sids thus they will not be partnered. Thus, issuing a Reveal query to U j does not violate the freshness of the instance of U i , but in fact U i and U j will compute the same session key because the only difference between this session and an honest execution is that test
is not used by U j in verifications nor computations that affect the established session key since it only uses messages from its left and right neighbours; thus it will equal the session key computed by other group members. Thus, changing test L i for U j necessarily translates to U j not being partnered with other group members although U j computes the same session key as others. Again, this is an issue related to correctness of the scheme.
In fact, if the definition of sid is not a function of all messages but of messages excluding test L i , then our attack above no longer works. However, this would be a non-standard definition that differs from existing literature [4] , [10] .
Interestingly, the earlier scheme by the same authors Abdalla et al. [1] for which security can only be proven in the random oracle and ideal cipher models, resists this attack because there is correctness issue. To be precise, session key computation is a function of all broadcast messages, thus ensuring that partnered instances will compute the same key, and vice versa.
Conclusion
Our results cover two of three known PAGKE schemes provably secure in the standard model. The third scheme, by Bohli et al. [6] , appears to resist attacks that we have presented. It is also known [3] that the Bohli et al. scheme is more efficient that the Abdalla-Pointcheval scheme. Thus current results gives more preference towards the Bohli et al. scheme than the other two schemes in [17] , [3] .
The approach we take is one of analyzing security protocols often with accompanying provable security proofs. Such protocols attract analysis attention since they were by right rigorously designed and analyzed within formally defined security models; thus any claim-invalidating attacks potentially reveal insights into subtleties missed by existing proofs or proof techniques. See [20] , [23] , [24] for other related work in this direction.
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